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This paper uses original research on the roles played by two sets of foreign entrants 
into Chinese retailing since the 1850s - the overseas Chinese entrants and western 
entrants - to explore the psychic distance paradox over the long run. It explains how 
the advantages of psychic closeness in Chinese retailing have always been important 
in reducing entry barriers, but that the increasing costs of technology have increased 
the significance of firm proprietary strengths in some formats, notably supermarkets, 
so reducing the relative importance of psychic closeness. The paper therefore 
illustrates how taking the long-term perspective enables more sophisticated 
conclusions to emerge. A cross sectional analysis of one sector – Chinese 
supermarkets – would confirm the psychic distance paradox; overseas Chinese have 
been unable to translate psychic closeness into superior performance. By contrast their 
historic performance in department stores and more recently in fashion chains has 
been superior to the format leaders. This long term perspective therefore suggests that 
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  2 
Revisiting the Psychic Distance Paradox: International Retailing in 
China in the Long Run (1840-2005) 
 
 
Explaining the sequence of decisions in the internationalisation process remains a key 
area of scholarly discussion within the international business academic community. 
While economics models dominate the literature, neither macro economic nor 
internalisation approaches are particularly helpful in explaining how multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) evaluate entry decisions in conditions of great uncertainty. The 
Uppsala school incorporates a more behavioural approach to the internalisation 
process and has therefore become a favoured approach among scholars trying to 
understand foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns across more complex markets. A 
key assumption in the Uppsala model is that MNEs will increasingly commit to 
foreign markets over time as a result of organisational learning. It predicts that as 
firms accumulate experience and collect information and so reduce uncertainty, they 
will progressively diversify into markets with a higher ‘psychic distance’.
1 While this 
seems intuitively attractive, it is nevertheless the case that after three decades scholars 
still lack a clear consensus regarding the conceptualisation and measurement of 
‘psychic distance’.
2 Conclusions on the pattern of firms’ foreign expansion and its 
relationship with psychic distance remain elusive,




This article seeks to contribute to this debate by focusing on the role played by 
psychic distance in influencing investment decisions into China over a long period, 
  3the 150 years from 1850 to the present. Despite later research being dominated by 
cross-sectional panels, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) seminal work on 
psychic distance followed Nordic multinationals’ internationalisation over time.
5 
Indeed, a moment’s reflection on the nature of the concept of psychic distance 
suggests that longitudinal approaches are likely to be more appropriate methodologies 
for assessing evolutionary patterns.
6 Any longitudinal approach to understand firm 
behaviour must of course be wary of falling into the traps of poor historical 
methodology. Most obviously any ‘survivorship’ bias must be avoided by 
scrupulously documenting a large proportion of all activities, as opposed to 
concentrating just on the successful actions.
7 
 
Ideally the article would be able to survey all instances of FDI into China since 1850, 
but in practice it has been necessary to reduce the population of entrants to 
manageable proportions. The article’s particular focus is on the relationship between 
psychic distance and subsidiary performance, where (as will be discussed below) the 
empirical data has produced something of a paradox, in that subsidiary performance 
appears to be positively correlated with psychic distance, rather than the predicted 
negative correlation. One of the seminal empirical contributions here was the study of 
Canadian retailers in the United States.
8 For the purposes of including some 
replication of sectors in our study with this study, retailing industry in the Chinese 
market rather than any developed (or indeed any other developing) market is chosen, 
in particular our study has focused on assessing the relationship between psychic 
distance and the performance of subsidiaries in Chinese retailing since 1850. 
 
  4Our results show that over this long period there was remarkable continuity, in that 
perhaps the majority of early entrants into Chinese retailing industry were overseas 
Chinese. This sequence of entry suggests that psychic distance plays a key role in 
retailers’ internationalisation process; those who perceived the Chinese market with 
less uncertainty and risk entered first. These overseas Chinese entrants were, however, 
possessed few if any technological advantages in retailing. Despite their lack of firm-
specific capabilities in novel retail formats, they were typically able to convert their 
first mover advantages into superior performance over a long period. Only in the 
supermarket sector did overseas Chinese entrants succumb to western competitors. In 
other words, only in supermarket sector did these retailers fail to transform psychic 
closeness into superior performance. Therefore, this paper offers some substantial 
revision to the widely accepted, but weakly supported idea that psychic distance has 
direct link with firm performance. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the history 
of international retailing, situating the Chinese experience within the broader global 
experience. Section III then provides the theoretical background of the paper. This is 
followed by a detailed discussion of the key patterns and trends of foreign entry into 
Chinese retailing over the past 150 years. The final section concludes the whole paper 
by highlighting its contribution to research on psychic distance.   
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                                                            II 
 
Retailing activities have been associated with some of the very earliest forms of FDI, 
with Chartered Trading Companies, for example, frequently incorporating retailing as 
a subsidiary element of their business activities in host locations. But it has only been 




Despite this lack of recognition of earlier activities, retailing has nevertheless 
experienced sustained and significant levels of internationalisation. This has typically 
been associated either with the diffusion of novel retail formats (like department 
stores around the end of the nineteenth century, or variety chain stores in the early 
decades of the twentieth century) or with the overseas marketing efforts of 
manufacturers of novel consumer goods, like sewing machines or automobiles, which 
included investing in company-controlled retail activities.
10 The best empirical data 
comes from a substantial study by Godley on inward investment into British retailing 
since 1850. Despite previous estimates suggesting that retail entrants were relatively 
rare before 1980, Godley has shown that the number of entrants was in fact 
surprisingly high, with 154 retailing subsidiaries of overseas firms entering between 
1850 and 1979. Overwhelmingly they either failed, or were quickly acquired by 
British interests, or remained relatively obscure, contributing to their under-reporting. 
Nevertheless they can be grouped into several categories: foreign producers of luxury 
goods that needed to acquire retail premises to restrict price competition; those 
  6foreign producers of novel consumer goods who needed to gain greater control over 
the promotion of their branded goods even to the extent of investing in distribution 
outlets; and a small minority (only 18 between 1850 and 1962) of overseas retailers 
who had developed novel retail formats and wished to expand internationally.
11  
 
The Chinese experience of international retailing broadly follows the UK experience, 
albeit with some substantial lag and with a much smaller level of overall activity, both 
almost certainly arising from China’s much lower per capita income level, and, hence, 
smaller market for retailing.
12 Moreover some allowance for the impact of political 
and economic shocks, like the Japanese invasion, or the Mao inspired autarchy, also 
need to be taken into account. 
 
While there may have been some entrants into the Chinese luxury goods retailing 
sector, our research has not been able to identify any significant entrants. Indeed, to 
be sure, there was none of any great size in the UK either. It was simply that the 
concentration of demand in London provided an opportunity denied almost anywhere 
else in the world. Rather, given its much smaller potential market for luxury goods, it 
is surely the case that foreign luxury goods producers distributed in China via 
incumbent independent retailers, as they did elsewhere. Moreover, while Singer 
invested in a Chinese distribution system, as it did everywhere around the world, it 
was very much the exception among western manufacturers of branded consumer 
goods. However, Singer was relatively unsuccessful in China.
13 Rather, and in 
contrast with the British case, overseas entrants into Chinese retailing over this period 
were overwhelmingly retailers trying to internationalise some novel retail format, 
whether it was the department store, fashion store or supermarket formats. We turn to 
  7a more detailed consideration of these novel retail formats and the foreign entrants in 






The studies of the internationalisation process of Nordic multinationals in the mid-
1970s have been widely accepted as the starting point for research on psychic 
distance.
14 According to these studies, psychic distance referred to those factors that 
could prevent or disturb the flow of information between suppliers and customers.
15 
Difference in the environments may incur learning costs, which makes psychic 
distance a significant deterrent to market entry. Thus, firms will start their 
international expansion from psychically similar markets before entering into those 
markets with greater psychic distance. In other words, a lack of experience of foreign 
markets is the dominant barrier to internationalisation, which can only be accumulated 
through firms’ activities in specific markets.
16  In order to avoid uncertainty, the entry 
sequence may reflect an evolutionary learning-through-experience process, with 
psychically close markets being the first entered. 
17 
 
Since then, the definition of psychic distance has been revised and changed within the 
literature, depending upon how the concept is operationalized.
18 For example, it was 
redefined by Nordstrom and Vahlne as ‘factors preventing or disturbing firm’s 
learning about and understanding a foreign environment’. 
19 But later empirical 
research used culture distance as proxy for psychic distance, even though the 
  8conceptual difference between these two has been acknowledged. 
20 Others treated 
psychic distance as a combination of cultural differences and business differences that 
presented barriers for firms to learn about foreign markets. 
21 Child, Ng and Wong 
argued that psychic distance was a combination of distance-creating, distance-
compressing and distance-bridging factors. While distance-creating factors created the 
difference between home and host countries, distance-compressing factors narrowed 
the difference. As for the distance-bridging factors, they mainly referred to how firms 
made strategic and operational decisions to reduce the uncertainty in overseas 
markets. 
22  However, recently some scholars have argued that previous research fails 
to encapsulate the two most important elements in the concept of psychic distance: 
psychic and distance. While psychic means the mind or soul, distance relates to the 
degree of similarity or difference that exists in peoples’ minds. 
23 Therefore, they 
define psychic distance as ‘the distance between the home market and a foreign 
market, resulting from the perception of both culture and business differences’. 
24 In 
other words, psychic difference refers to individuals’ perceptions of the differences 
between markets. 
 
The various definitions mean that psychic distance remains one of the most vaguely 
measured constructs in the domain of international business. 
25 Up till now, extant 
literature is still debating whether psychic distance should be measured by objective 
variables or people’s subjective perceptions; or whether it should be measured at 
individual level or national level. 
26 For example, while some researchers have used 
variables such as culture distance, business difference and religion difference to 
measure psychic distance, 
27 others have argued psychic distance should be measured 
by decision-makers’ perceptions of the target markets. According to these scholars, 
  9psychic distance refers to individuals’ perceptions of the differences between the 
home country and the foreign country, which may not be stable over time, nor 
homogeneous within firms, and so it would be misleading if psychic distance was 
measured by objective variables. 
28 In other words, research should measure 
managers’ perceptions of psychic distance at the time of decision-making to gauge its 
importance. But in reality few researchers have the time and resources to do so. In 
addition, cognitive mapping (a compromise method measuring decision makers’ 
perception ex post) cannot identify the direction of causality. 
29  
 
A second debate among current research is about the level that psychic distance 
should be measured. Because individuals’ perceptions are highly subjective, some 
scholars point out that psychic distance should only be applied at the individual 
level.
30 This is because people’s ethnic background, religion and education level may 
vary within a country, thus measuring it at national level may hide important 
difference. However, others contended that national measurement of psychic distance 
could be appropriate if research just focused on the aggregate behaviour of firms. 
31  
 
The above debates on the definition and measurement of psychic distance lead to 
mixed results in empirical research. For example, while some documented a negative 
correlation between psychic distance and market entry of Australian exporters, others 
failed to establish such a link.
32 In particular, the relationship between psychic 
distance and subsidiary performance has produced a paradox. One of the key 
assumptions of psychic distance is that psychically close countries are more similar to 
home countries, thus are associated with lower uncertainty.
33  This, therefore, implies 
a negative relationship between psychic distance and firms’ performance; as the costs 
  10associated with higher uncertainty are ceterus paribus likely to adversely affect 
performance.
34  Despite its acceptance among international business researchers, the 
empirical research has generally found the opposite outcome: psychic distance is 
typically positively correlated with company financial performance and strategic 
effectiveness, a phenomenon called the psychic distance paradox. 
35 For example, 
O’Grady and Lane, by focusing on Canadian retailers operating in the US markets, 
reported a situation where psychically close market was a handicap, perhaps because 
of the Canadian managers’ inappropriate preconceptions about the US market.
36   
 
Several explanations have been put forward to attempt to account for the existence of 
the psychic distance paradox. First, it has been argued that similarity between home 
markets and those psychically close markets has made executives overlook subtle but 
important differences in the foreign markets.
37 Second, the concept of liability of 
foreignness (LOF) suggests when venturing abroad, multinational firms may incur 
extra costs than domestic firm due to the institutional and cultural differences between 
home and host countries. Previous research argues these differences depend on the 
perceived familiarity of the entrant firm with the foreign markets. Thus in psychically 
close markets managers may adopt limited learning efforts and fail to mitigate 
LOFs.
38 Finally, the positive relationship between psychic distance and organizational 
performance may be attributed to the high uncertainty in the psychically distant 
markets. As markets with high uncertainty are perceived with high risk, thus in order 
to reduce risk, firms may undertake extensive research to learn more about the 




  11 
In short, if we can assume that uncertainty avoidance is a key consideration 
explaining variations in the patterns of firm internationalisation, the theory predicts a 
positive relationship between psychic distance and the sequence of market entry and a 
negative relationship between psychic distance and company performance. But 
empirical support remains elusive. The Chinese example may become helpful here 
because of the large and continuous gap in psychic distance between it and western 
sources of new technological capabilities over the twentieth century. The paper uses 
original research on the roles played by two sets of foreign entrants into Chinese 
retailing industry since the 1840s - the overseas Chinese entrants and western entrants 
- to explore the relationship between psychic distance and retail performance over the 
long run.          
 
          
 
                                                            IV 
 
 
Over the long run, entry patterns into Chinese retailing followed broadly similar 
trends to those in more advanced economies,
40 with the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century characterised by department store formats, giving way to 
fashion chains and supermarkets and hypermarkets in recent decades. A common 
feature across all formats is that none of the global pioneers of new retail formats, the 
equivalents of those on the technological frontier (such as Harrods in department store 
format,
41 Carrefour in supermarket/hypermarket format and Benetton in fashion 
  12retailing), entered China before overseas Chinese entrants. The overseas Chinese were 
the pioneer entrants, but typically did not enter with their own novel retail formats, 
but rather with ideas that had been copied from western sources. The cases of the 
three different retail sectors of department stores, fashion chains, and supermarkets 




The emergence of foreign department stores in China could be partly attributed to the 
Opium Wars where seventeen treaty ports (including Shanghai and Nanjing) were 
opened to commerce, Hong Kong was colonized and foreign ships were allowed entry 
to the Yangzi River.
42 From that point, the country witnessed a huge influx of 
imported goods ranging from cottons, clocks, lamps, buttons and glassware, all of 
which became the key items distributed through the earliest department stores in 
China, the first novel retail format imported into China by overseas retailers.
43 
Moreover, the rapid urbanization of the cities, 
44 together with the improvement in 
city transportation infrastructure, 
45 also supported the new department store format to 
spread. 
 
The origins of the department store format in China can be traced back to middle of 
the nineteenth century, when several British department stores, such as Whiteaway, 
Laidlow and Hall & Holtz opened in Shanghai. As they mainly served the growing 
number of foreign residents in China, they had little or no direct impact on the 
Chinese retail sector. 
46 Furthermore, these embryonic department stores were usually 
  13very small in size with limited merchandise. 
47 They were little more than expanded 
speciality stores.  
 
What we would understand as the modern department store format (with its many 
departments and much more significant size) was, in fact, introduced by overseas 
Chinese, who enjoyed no proprietary strengths in retailing before venturing into 
China. Among them, the Sincere, Wing On, Sun Sun and Dah Sun (collectively know 
as the Big Four) became well known in Chinese history as the pioneers of modern 
department stores in China and had an enormous impact on the evolution of the 
Chinese retailing industry. 
48  
 
The key entrepreneurs behind these four department stores were all overseas 
Australian Chinese, who originally came from the same place (Canton province) 
before moving to Australia, and developed very close working relationships when 
they were in Sydney. Indeed, apart from one, Sun Sun, they even followed the same 
development route, namely, they all began their Chinese department store businesses 
in Hong Kong, establishing the headquarters there. As business grew, they opened 
new branches in the city of Guangzhou (Canton), and finally attracted by the huge 
market potential in Shanghai, they opened their stores on Nan Jing Road (Table I) 
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Table 1: Big Four Establishment in Shanghai 
 




20 Oct. 1917  Nanjing Road, 
Shanghai 




5 Sept. 1918  Nanjing Road, 
Shanghai 




23 Jan. 1926  Nanjing Road, 
Shanghai 




10 Jan. 1936  Nanjing Road, 
Shanghai 
Ten floors  Cai Cang 
Source: Shanghai Social Science Academy, 1980 
Notes – The sources do not list the size of each store in terms of square feet, but the 
proxy of the numbers of floors has been included here. 
 
 
They all sold similar products ranging from clock and watches from Sweden, toys and 
mechanic tools from Germany to local specialities like silk from Su Zhou. They also 
had similar store design with a roof-top entertainment quarter above the store, and 
adjoining bars, restaurant and hotels attached to the store business. This store design 
was mainly based on the entrepreneurs’ own shopping experience in Sydney’s 
  15flagship department store Anthony Hordern & Son, combined with their own ideas. 
For example, in Sincere Ma adapted the original department store concept to the 
Chinese context by showing products in elaborate window displays, imposing fixed 
prices for each item, allocating different sales teams for each merchandise category, 
and adding a roof-top entertainment quarter on the store.
49 
 
All these stores achieved very rapid rates of growth, despite the growing instability in 
the wider economy, where patriotic boycotts, workers strikes and civil wars in the 
1920s, were followed by the world economic depression and the Japanese invasion in 
the 1930s.
50 Table II gives a brief overview of the business situation of these stores 



















Table 2: Big Four Department Stores Sales Growth to 1936 
 
  
Year Opened  Sales in First 
Business Year (Unit: 
Thousand Chinese 
currency)   Sales in 1936 
Annualised 

















110 -  - 
Source: Shanghai No.1 Department Store, 1988 
 
Interestingly, the Big Four Department Stores were all located on the same road in 
Shanghai as the British-origin department stores, thus competition was unavoidable. 
In order to increase their turnovers, the Big Four adopted very aggressive competitive 
strategies. For example, while the British- and other foreign-origin department stores 
sold relatively expensive products, as they were directly imported from Europe, the 
Australian overseas Chinese entrants used the following strategies to reduce prices 
and reach out to a broader market. 
 
  17First of all, they adjusted their product ranges. They not only cut the prices on cigars 
and alcohol to attract more foreign customers, but also introduced some cheaper 
imported goods as well as local specialities.  
 
Secondly, they sent direct mail printed in English to foreign customers’ homes during 
Christmas time and advertised their prices in newspapers and magazines to attract 
customer’ attention. Such aggressive advertising strategies had never been used in 
Chinese retailing industry before. 
51  
 
In order to fight against the Big Four, those British-origin stores began to advertise 
their promotions on “Shen Bao (Shen Newspaper)” and “Wen Hui Bao” (Wen Hui 
Newspaper) to attract local custom. For example, on 1
st, January 1937 both 
Whiteaway & Laidlow and Hall & Holtz department stores advertised on Shen Bao 
claiming that they offered special promotions on certain items with discounts ranging 
from 19% to 50%. But they lacked flexibility in adjusting their product portfolios. 
52 
and refused to sell any local products. So, in the 1930s these British-origin stores all 
closed down.  By contrast, the Big Four survived the Japanese invasion and war, with 
Wing On the last one to close its stores in mainland in 1956.
53 
 
In sum, the Australian overseas Chinese entrants into Chinese retailing transformed 
the department store sector despite having no proprietorial knowledge or capabilities 
in the department store format. Nevertheless they (the Big Four) were able to copy a 
sufficient amount of the technology embodied in the department store format from 
visiting the flagship Sydney store, and then adapting it to the Chinese context using 
their own ideas, so that they outcompeted the western incumbents, who, it is safe to 
  18assume, had better access to the underlying technology in the retail format. The Big 
Four themselves were nationalised after the accession of the Communist Party to 
government, a period to which the article now turns in its examination of the second 




After 1949 international retailing activities almost disappeared in China. In particular, 
after 1950s’ nationalisation campaign, virtually all retail distributors in China were 
state-owned. Merchandise was manufactured by state-owned factories and food was 
grown on state-owned communes, a system of state-owned middleman distributed all 
goods, and prices were set by the government. 
54 From 1978 China has been moving 
back from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy, and retailing 
internationalisation activities have also begun to re-emerge.  
 
The first foreign fashion retailer came from the Hong Kong based Goldlion, who in 
1986 rented a sales counter in a local department store in Canton to sell its products. 
55 Established by Dr. Tsang Hin-chi in Hong Kong in 1968, Goldlion started its 
business as a family workshop for upmarket male neckties with total investment of 
6,000 HK dollars, 
56 one sewing machine and one pair of scissors. The brand logo – 
Goldlion - was created by Tsang in Singapore and then registered as a trademark in 
Hong Kong in 1971. By the middle 1970s, it had become one of the most successful 
fashion retailers in Hong Kong. Dissatisfied with Hong Kong’s market potential, in 
the early 1973 Goldlion started its international expansion by going to Japan, where, 




In 1983-1984, Goldlion first started its business activities in China through the 
revolutionary (for China at this time) route of placing its advertisement on China 
Central Television Station (CCTV) just after the 7 pm news program (the most 
popular TV program at that time). From this advertisement Chinese consumers first 
learned about the Goldlion brand. After that, the brand appeared in repeat 
advertisements on the radio, in newspapers, magazines and billboards, with the slogan 
‘Goldlion, the men’s world’. Dr. Tsang believed in saturation advertising. Therefore, 
in 1983 Goldlion’s ads appeared in over 30 Chinese TV stations, with most of them 
broadcasting its ads throughout the year. Furthermore, he also sponsored a national 
football tournament in China, and named it ‘Goldlion football tournament’, where the 
best six teams in China competed. As the tournament was watched by millions of 
Chinese, Goldlion easily increased its brand awareness across the country. 
58 
 
After three year advertising, on 4
th March 1986, Dr. Tsang opened a joint venture in 
China to manufacture its products with total investment of (US) $1 million. The 
factory building was four-floors high, with all the machines imported from Italy and 
Germany. In the same year, with the aim of building Goldlion as a national brand that 
the Chinese could be proud of, it opened its first sales counter in a local department 
store in South China. From then, its Chinese business grew very quickly. In 1993 
when China just officially opened its retailing industry to foreign investors, Goldlion 
already had 460 sales counters in most of the major cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, 
Guangzhou, and its total sales was over one billion Chinese RMB (around £6.3 
  20million). By 2004, Goldlion had over 800 sales outlets in 32 provinces with six 
different product divisions and has become one of the major players in China’s 
fashion retailing industry. 
59   
 
By contrast, the first western fashion retailer entering into China was Benetton, the 
biggest Italy fashion firm, who in 1991 established a joint venture in Beijing, called 
Beijing Benetton Fashion Ltd. to manufacture garments (but it did not open stores at 
that time). Benetton, of course, began its international expansion as early as 1970s. By 
1992 it had penetrated into over 100 countries across the world, becoming easily the 
most successful global fashion retailer. Its successful retail format mainly relies on 
franchising, where the franchisees purchase their entire inventory from Benetton and 
displaye them following company standards. This, combined with novel advertising 
and sponsorship strategies, have helped to create one of the world’s foremost 
brands.
60  Its expansion into China has followed the same model.  
 
What is so noteworthy here is that the owner of the technical knowledge embodied in 
the novel retail format – Benetton - has in fact been superseded by an overseas 
Chinese entrant in the Chinese market, an entrant with only a tiny fraction of the 
proprietary knowledge about fashion retailing.
61 As was the case with the department 
store format, it was the overseas Chinese entrant that has so far outperformed the 
technologically superior western counterpart. By 2004 Goldlion had opened over 800 
stores across the whole country, by contrast, Benetton’s aim was to open its 200th 
store in China by the end of 2008. 
 
 
  21Supermarkets/Hypermarkets 
The first foreign supermarket entered into China was Parkson, the retail division of 
the Malaysian Lion Group. In 1994 Parkson was approved by the central government 
to open foreign department stores and supermarkets in China. However, Parkson was 
a relative newcomer to retailing, it only started its retail business in Malaysia in 1987 
and, before entering into China, it had only gained experience in the department store 
sector and had no experience of running supermarkets. 
62  
 
In a same vein, the first foreign hypermarket approved by the Chinese central 
government was Lotus, part of the Thailand conglomerate Charoen Pokphand group 
(CP), in 1994. Although CP had opened some supermarkets in South East Asian 
countries to distribute its shrimp and chicken, it had no previous experience in 
running the hypermarket format before venturing into China. 
63  
 
Both Parkson and Lotus founders were overseas Chinese, who had emigrated and 
started their businesses in the 1920s and 1930s in South East Asia. Both entrepreneurs 
had created large conglomerates in their own countries. But crucially neither had 
acquired any obvious proprietorial strength in the supermarket/hypermarket sectors 
before investing in Chinese retailing, nor did they subsequently acquire any 
technological expertise. Rather the entrepreneurs were attracted by the huge potential 
of the Chinese market and, exploiting their familiarity with the Chinese market, they 
acted opportunistically and ventured into Chinese retailing industry as soon as it was 
opened to the foreign investors in 1992 and simply copied what they could of the 
western supermarket/ hypermarket formats.  
 
  22The first western foreign hypermarket entered into China was the French firm 
Carrefour, who, without the central government approval, opened its first store in 
Beijing in 1995. 
64 The history of Carrefour’s internationalisation can be dated back 
to 1970s, when the French government tried to limit the domestic expansion o
hypermarkets to preserve the integrity of small grocery stores. With half of its sales 
coming from outside France, Carrefour has now become the most internationalised 
food retailer in the world with a presence in 30 countries. 
f 
65 Carrefour was also the 
first international retailer to expand into Asia, with its first store in Taiwan opening in 
1989. 
66 It is widely recognised as the world leader in internationalising the 
supermarket/ hypermarket retail format. Nevertheless, and as was the case with the 
fashion sector and the technological leader there, Benetton, Carrefour’s entrance into 
China was later than the pioneer overseas Chinese entrants into Chinese the 
supermarket/ hypermarket sector.  
 
However, and in contrast to the experience of the department store and fashion 
retailing sectors, those pioneering overseas Chinese entrants into the Chinese 
supermarket/ hypermarket sector, such as Parkson and CP, have failed to capitalise on 
their first mover advantages and have subsequently lost market share to later entrants. 
In this sector it is the western late-movers, like Carrefour, that have grown to become 
the biggest foreign retailers in the sector. By the end of 2005, Carrefour had opened 
78 hypermarkets across the whole country with total sales 17.4 billion Chinese RMB 
(around (US) $2.1 billion). In contrast Parkson has only opened just over 30 stores, 










Historical evidence therefore suggests that over the past 150 years early entrants into 
Chinese retailing industry have overwhelmingly been based in Hong Kong, Australia, 
Thailand and Malaysia. However, it does not make much sense to treat these entrants 
as typical entrants from those nations. Rather, when tracking the ethnic backgrounds 
of the founders, our results show that overseas Chinese founded retailers entered 
China earlier than their western counterparts.  In other words, when measured at 
individual level, it is reasonable to infer that psychic distance had a clear impact on 
the entry sequence, with those retailers who perceived Chinese market with less 
uncertainty and risk entering first.
68  This is because market differences largely 
depend on the retail managers’ perceptions of the target market. Therefore compared 
with their counterparts in the West, those overseas Chinese would perceive the 
Chinese market with less uncertainty, as they were quite familiar with the Chinese 
environment (culture and business environment). Some of them like Ma of Sincere 
and Dr. Tsang of Goldlion could even speak the same language, which would reduce 
their communication costs of business transaction. Furthermore, the guanxi (personal 
networks) these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs had in China may well have reduced 
institutional uncertainty and facilitated information exchange, both of which would 
have helped to mitigate LOFs and so led to early entry. 
69 
 
  24However, while psychic closeness appears to correlate with entry in Chinese retailing, 
as elsewhere, the relationship between psychic distance and subsidiary performance in 
Chinese retailing varies across the different retail sectors. In the department store and 
fashion formats, the overseas Chinese entrants not only entered first but also 
converted their first mover advantages into superior performance. In the supermarket 
and hypermarket sector, by contrast, the western entrants have emerged as more 
successful. Perhaps what is observed then is a paradox within a paradox, as the 
psychic distance paradox seemingly emerges as an important interpretation of relative 
performance among foreign entrants in Chinese retailing only in one sub-sector. In 
contrast to the Canadian retailers in the US, in China the majority experience was for 
psychically close entrants, the overseas Chinese entrants, to have enjoyed more 
success than western entrants, despite western entrants being closer to sources of 
technological innovation in retail formats. The only exception, the only sub-sector 
where the pattern observed by O’Grady and Lane was also the case in China was in 
the supermarket sector.   
 
Explaining this dual outcome requires a more nuanced understanding of the 
technological content of retailing, and hence, a better understanding of the nature of 
those firm-specific advantages that are able to be internalised in the 
internationalisation process.  Previous research suggests different kinds of retail 
formats can be roughly divided into those formats that are mainly constituted of 
external elements and those mainly constituted of internal elements. While the former 
refers to those elements that are visible to consumers, such as the shopping 
environment and prices, the latter is defined as those elements that determine 
retailers’ operational strength and strategic directions, such as managerial skills and 
  25marketing techniques. 
70  When using this framework to compare department store 
and fashion retailing with hypermarket/supermarket formats, it can be argued that 
they vary in the complexity of the elements of the formats.  
 
For example, the key advantages of the department stores format over traditional 
retail outlets in the early twenty century could be summarized as: goods were 
displayed in windows; different kinds of goods were sold under the same roof; fixed 
prices were imposed for each item, and merchandise was assigned to different sales 
teams. 
71 Furthermore, when foreign department stores began to take full shape in 
China, the key marketing techniques they used were also very simple, such as sending 
direct mail to their existing and potential customers to inform new products or 
promotions. 
72 All of these techniques could easily be copied. Similarly, with the 
development of new digital technologies, fashion retailers’ merchandise and clothes 
designs could also be easily copied at very low cost, thus making the fundamental 
offering in the fashion format hard to protect. 
73  
 
By contrast, the hypermarket/supermarket format is relatively far more complex. 
Hypermarkets usually refer to those stores owned by food retailers with large sales 
area to sell both food items and non-food items under the same roof. Furthermore, 
hypermarkets may also include car parking areas, access areas for goods delivery and 
a petrol filling station. 
74 A well-developed logistics system is crucial for 
hypermarkets to offer lower prices to consumer while maintaining high volumes of 
goods moving. But technologically this is very complex. For example, a logistics 
system could include at least five components: communication, unitisation and 
packaging, transportation, inventory and storage facilities. Furthermore, retailers 
  26need to cooperate with manufacturers to build and maintain an effective and efficient 
logistics system, as delays and errors from the manufacturers will influence retailers’ 
performance. This can be even more challenging for international retailers whose 
suppliers may spread across the world. Therefore, recently retailers have begun to 
cooperate and collaborate with others (in particular manufacturers and logistics firms) 
to develop integrated logistics approaches to producing a seamless supply, such as 
efficient consumer response (ECR) and supply chain management (SCM). 
75 But 
these systems require huge investments, new technology and a cooperative 
relationship between manufacturers and retailers. Thus they are very difficult to copy. 
 
In both department store and hypermarket/supermarket format, none of those overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs had any obvious propietorial strength in their own sectors 
before investing in China. The concepts of these new retail formats were mainly 
learned through those entrepreneurs’ own shopping experiences in the department 
store/supermarket/hypermarket abroad. Hence they could just copy those external 
elements that were quite visible to consumers and competitors, but not the internal 
elements. 
 
The key advantages of the department store format over traditional retail format were 
all quite visible to consumers. Thus those entrepreneurs could grasp the format just 
from their own shopping experiences. Since the department store format was so easy 
to copy, therefore the key determinants of success depended on the knowledge of the 
market and how to adapt the western technology (department store format) to local 
conditions. As the founders of Big Four Department Stores (Sincere, Wing On, Sun 
Sun and Dah Sun) had been local residents in Canton before they moved abroad, they 
  27were quite familiar with the Chinese market. Thus their access to the department store 
format in Sydney, Australia, enabled them to become the pioneers and introduce it to 
the Chinese market. Furthermore, based on their superior market knowledge, the 
overseas Chinese entrants then adapted the western technology to the local condition 
and so transform their psychic closeness into sustainable competitive advantages.
76  
 
Overseas Chinese-founded fashion retailers were also able to dominate Chinese 
fashion retailing sector for similar reasons, that is, their success mainly depended on 
the knowledge of the market and adapting a format to the local conditions. As was the 
case with the founders of Big Four, Dr. Tsang was originally from Canton before he 
moved to Hong Kong. He was the pioneer retailer to enter into fashion retailing in 
China, but the Goldlion format exhibits none of the organisational complexity or 
technological content of Benetton. It is rather a pared down, simple copy of a western 
retail format, yet one that when combined with superior local market knowledge has 
become transformed into a competitive performance superior to Benetton or any other 
western fashion entrant.
77   
 
But this was not the case for the supermarket/hypermarket format. One key advantage 
of a hypermarket/supermarket is its well-developed logistics system. This cannot be 
learned just from informal shopping experiences. Thus, although those overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs might copy the shopping environment, merchandising plan and 
other external elements of the format, they would find great difficulty to achieve the 
same efficiency as their western counterparts. In other words, even though overseas 
Chinese retailers from Thailand and Malaysia enjoyed advantages of psychic 
closeness, because they lacked knowledge of the internal elements of the 
  28hypermarket/ supermarket format, they could not run their 
supermarkets/hypermarkets efficiently, and so failed to transform their psychic 
closeness into superior performance.   
 
In short, the above evidence implies that the technological content of international 
retailing is now much higher than before, so that early entry (together with the 
superior market knowledge) is no longer sufficient to base a durable competitive 
strategy on. Instead the technological content of modern supermarket/hypermarket has 
enabled the format’s global technological leaders to emerge successfully, despite not 





By tracking foreign entrants into Chinese retailing industry over the past 150 years, 
this article has demonstrated that the construct of psychic distance has a clear impact 
on explaining the entry sequence when measured at an individual level. In other 
words, psychic distance should be conceptualised as decision makers’ perceptions of 
the difference between home markets and host markets. Furthermore, while psychic 
distance has always been important in reducing retailers’ entry barriers, the increasing 
complexity of technology has increased the significance of proprietary strengths in 
some formats, notably supermarkets. The culturally close overseas Chinese from the 
large Chinese diasporas enjoyed no proprietary strengths in retailing before venturing 
into China. They were not particularly important retail innovators in any of the 
immigrant economies. But they were able to copy retail innovations in advanced 
  29economies and export them successfully back to China. Unlike the psychically close 
Canadian retailers in the United States, the overseas Chinese entrants were hugely 
successful in the Chinese market, out-competing even western entrants with better 
access to proprietary technologies, but only in some formats – department store and in 
fashion chain. There is no evidence of any psychic distance paradox here. But the 
paradox re-emerges in the Chinese supermarket sector, where, despite enjoying first 
mover status, overseas Chinese entrants have succumbed to retailers from more 
psychically distant markets such as U.S. and West Europe. The article therefore 
illustrates how taking the long-term perspective enables more sophisticated 
conclusions to emerge. A cross sectional analysis of one sector – Chinese 
supermarkets – would confirm the psychic distance paradox; overseas Chinese, like 
Canadian retailers in the U.S., have been unable to translate psychic closeness into 
superior performance. By contrast their historic performance in department stores and 
more recently in fashion chains suggests that the psychic distance paradox needs to be 
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2002, pp. 36-56).   
19 Nordstrom and Vahlne, Is the Global Shrinking, pp. 41-56. 
20 For example, cultural distance and psychic distance were used interchangeably in 
Benito and Gripsrud, 1992, pp. 461-476. 
21 Psychic distance was defined as a combination of cultural and business distance 
(O’Grady and Lane, 1996, 309-333). 
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2006, pp. 49-70).   
24 O’Grady and Lane, The Psychic Distance Paradox, pp. 309-333.  
25 Despite of its popularity in international business research, psychic distance 
remains vaguely measured (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006, pp. 578-602).   
26  For the debate on psychic distance conceptualisation, see Shenkar, 2001, pp. 519-
535; Sousa and Bradley, 2006, pp. 49-70; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006, pp. 578-602 and 
Brewer, 2007, pp. 44-66.  
27 Examples of using macro objective variables to measure psychic distance, please 
see O’Grady & Lane, The Psychic Distance Paradox, pp. 309-333. It is also worth 
mentioning Zaheer’s (1995 and 2002 – and other contributors to this special issue) 
contention that in many markets the liabilities of foreigness (which are in some as yet 
unspecified way linked to psychic distance) cannot be overcome. 
28 Examples of arguing measuring subjective perceptions to gauge psychic distance 
can be found in Shenkar, Culture Distance Revisited, pp. 519-535.  
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whether it is the action that change the perception remains unknown (Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006, pp. 578-602).  
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31 Other scholars argue measuring psychic distance at national level can be justified if 
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& Mavondo, 2002, pp.515-532).  
37 O’Grady and Lane, The Psychic Distance Paradox, pp. 309-333.  
38 This is because firms in psychically close markets will be difficulty to differentiate 
them from competitors (Evans, Treadgold & Mavondo, 2008, pp. 32-63).  
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see Osterhammel, 1989, pp.189-216.   
43 Two Chinese books - Shanghai No.1 Department Store (1988) and Shanghai Social 
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48 Chan, Personal Style, Culture Value and Management, pp. 141-166.  
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166).   
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53 Chan, Personal Style, Culture Value and Management, pp. 141-166. 
54 It can be argued the transformation of Chinese distribution reform in the 1980s set 
the stage of re-emergence of international retailing in China after 1949 (Vernon-
Wortzel & Wortzel, 1987, pp. 59-76).  
  35                                                                                                                                            
55 Davies, Foreign Investment in the Retail Sector of the People’s Republic of China, 
pp.56-69.  
56 The 6000 Hong Kong dollars were the life-savings of Dr. Tsang and his family 
when he moved from Fujian to Hong Kong in the 1960s 
57 This is recorded in a biography of Dr. Tsang.  
58 Davies, Foreign Investment in the Retail Sector of the People’s Republic of China, 
pp.56-69.  
59 http://www.goldlion-china.com accessed on 6
th May 2007.   
60 Crewe and Lowe, United Colours, pp. 271-283.  
61 And, indeed, H&M and other adapters of the Benetton model in China as 
elsewhere. 
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